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1 Introduction
We develop a partial equilibrium, competitive framework of a (potentially) vertically in-
tegrated industry. In our model there are three types of rms: upstream rms that use
primary factors to produce an intermediate; downstream rms that use primary factors and
intermediates to produce a nal good; and vertically integrated rms that do both. We
establish conditions under which vertically integrated rms exist and outsource (part of) the
production of the intermediate input. Specically, we ask the following questions: Why do
competitive rms vertically integrate? What changes in the economy, and, in particular, in
the demands of the intermediate and nal goods, can explain the vertical disintegration or
integration of competitive industries?
We build on the literature of multiproduct rms in competitive markets. That literature
illustrates market structures when there are two nal goods: A and B. This paper uses a
very similar framework, except the distinction being that good B is intermediate good in
the production of A. The results hinge on the concept of economies of scope. The compara-
tive statics show how the industry structure changes in response to changes in the external
demand of nal goods and intermediate goods and also changes in the cost structure. In
particular, we show that if economies of vertical scope are present then the vertical organiza-
tion of the industry is determined by the relative ratio of demands of intermediate and nal
output and by the ratio of costs. As the demand external to the industry for the intermediate
output changes, the equilibrium conguration of the industry changes as well. To develop
our analysis we use the simplest functions forms for cost and demand that are necessary to
demonstrate the results. We then justify how our results carry forward under more general
forms. As such, we hope that our simplications are considered as a point of strength rather
than a point of critique.
This paper formalizes George Stiglers [1951] take on vertical integration in his The
division of Labor is Limited by the Extent of the Market. Stigler shows that when the
industry grows, the vertically integrated rm outsources (part of) the production of the
intermediate good whose production process is subject to increasing costs. Stigler also
shows that when one of the production processes displays increasing returns to scale, it will
be turned over to specialists as the market grows. The specialists cannot charge more than
the average incremental cost that the vertically integrated rm would face if it were producing
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the intermediate input in-house. Thus the specialists face a negatively sloped elastic demand
for the intermediate input. As the market continues to grow, the new industry will become
competitive. Stigler limits the analysis to the case in which there are no economies of vertical
scope and one of the production processes is subject to increasing costs.
To formalize George Stiglers [1951] take on vertical integration we extend the competitive
framework developed by MacDonald and Slivinski [1987]. First, we allow for economies
of vertical scope to exist and we study when outsourcing occurs in the industry. In our
model (partial) outsourcing of the production plays a critical role in determining which
rms are present in equilibrium. Clearly, there is no scope for outsourcing in MacDonald
and Slivinskis horizontal multiproduct industry. Second, we determine the set of output
combinations that vertically competitive rms choose in equilibrium. From this set of output
combinations we are able to conclude whether there are only vertically integrated rms in
the industry, or whether there are also upstream or downstream rms. Third, we study the
industry when another industry sells the intermediate good into the market. We show how
the vertical structure of the industry depends on the ability of the producers of intermediate
output to compete at lower prices than the upstream rms.
Before moving on to the analysis, we want to stress how our model explains vertical
integration patterns from a technological perspective. In this sense, our approach stands in
contrast to the incomplete contracting literature (Williamson [1985], Hart and Moore [1988])
which often dismisses technological explanations of vertically integration.
In section 2 of the paper we introduce the notions of economies of vertical scope. In
section 3 we introduce the notion of economies of scope. In section 4 we dene a vertical
competitive equilibrium. In section 4 we study the vertical structure and equilibrium of the
industry when vertically integrated rms cannot outsource the production of the intermediate
input and when the industry produces a surplus of the intermediate output. In section 5 of
the paper we still consider the industry as producing a surplus of the intermediate input but
the vertically integrated rms now outsource the production of the input. In section 6 we
merge the results from section 3 and 4, and we present a comparative statics analysis to show
how the industry structure changes with changes in the aggregate output demands. Finally,
in section 7 we present the case when the industry buys the intermediate input. Section 8
summarizes the results and concludes the paper.
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2 Economies of Specialization and of Vertical Scope
The industry deals with three categories of commodities: a nal good y  0, an intermediate
product k, and a vector of primary factors x  0: This netput notation helps facilitate the
analysis. Let p; r; and w denote the associated market prices. Firms are price takers in all
markets and there is free entry in the markets of the nal good. There is free entry in the
market of the intermediate product when it is an output. pe denote the equilibrium price of
the nal good. re denotes the equilibrium price of the intermediate product when it is an
output.
The rm is upstream if it only produces k, and it is downstream if it only produces y.
For any rm under study, the nal good is always an output (y  0) and the primary
factors are always inputs (x  0). However, the intermediate product is always an output
for upstream rms (kU  0) and an input for downstream rms (kD  0). The net supply of
the intermediate product for a vertically integrated rm may be positive, negative, or zero.
That is, an integrated rm may operate a process that generates more, less, or exactly the
amount of the intermediate product that it requires to produce a specied level of the nal
good.
More formally, rms are assumed to operate one of the three production sets:
YU =

(x; y; k) 2 <m+2j0  k  f ( x) ; y = 0;x  0	 ;
YD =

(x; y; k) 2 <m+2j0  y  g ( x; k) ; k  0;x  0	 ;
YI =

(x; y; k) 2 <m+2jH (x; y; k)  0; y  0;x  0	 :
In this formulation, f and g are traditional production functions and H is a production
transformation function.
Next, we need to develop denitions that reect intuitive denitions of the technological
advantages of specialization and integration. First, we consider the production of the inter-
mediate good. The notion of specialization in the production is related to the ability of rms
of producing one single good more e¢ ciently than multiproduct rms can do if they only
produce the same good. The following two denitions capture this notion of specialization:
Denition 1 Economies of Upstream Specialization. When none of the nal good
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is produced, the upstream technology is at least as good as the integrated tech-
nology. That is, YU  YI for y = 0. Equivalently, this means that f ( x) 
maxk fkjH (x; 0; k)  0g :
Denition 2 Economies of Downstream Specialization. When the intermediate good
is not an output, the downstream technology is at least as good as the integrated
technology. That is, YD  YI for k  0.
Equivalently, g ( x; k)  maxy fyjH (x; y; k)  0; k  0g :
The notion of downstream specialization is less intuitive than that of upstream special-
ization. To see why, observe that only in exceptional cases the minimum e¢ cient scale of
producing an intermediate is proportional to that of producing the nal good, so that the
technologies are perfectly matched in terms of their outputs. Hence, a vertically integrated
rm normally produces too much or too little of the intermediate output for its own use.
This is why we expect economies of downstream specialization to exist.
When the vertically integrated rm can sell the intermediate good as an output, then it
can fully exploit economies of scope in the production of the nal and intermediate goods.
We dene economies of vertical scope next:
Denition 3 Economies of Vertical Scope. A collection of upstream, downstream, and
integrated technologies are said to exhibit economies of vertical scope if and only if
YI  YU + YD. Equivalently, given kU  0, kD  0, xU  0, xD  0 and yD  0 such
that kU  f
  xU and yD  g   xD; kD, then H  xU + xD; yD; kU + kD  0:
We expect to observe economies of vertical scope when producing a nal good lowers the
costs of producing the intermediate output. For example, if learning by doing is important in
designing the best intermediate input for the nal good, then producing them together can
be cheaper than producing them separately. However, if the intermediate and nal goods
are standardized, then economies of vertical scope are less likely to exist.
3 Vertical Competitive Equilibrium
There are two questions we need to address: First, are there vertically integrated rms in
the vertical competitive equilibrium? Second, can there be both vertically integrated and
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specialized rms in the equilibrium? The rst questions is easily answered. Panzar and
Willigs [1981] result that economies of scope are necessary and su¢ cient for the existence
of multiproduct rms in equilibrium is still valid here.1 Thus, we need to address the second
question, whether there are also upstream and downstream rms in equilibrium, and we need
to determine conditions that explain which type of rm is present in equilibrium.
To address this question, we follow MacDonald and Slivinski [1987] and introduce some
structure in the model. We denote the aggregate demand of nal output by Y and the net
demand of the intermediate input by K. If K > 0, then K is sold (we might say exported
to make it simpler to understand) to another industry which uses the same intermediate
input. If K < 0, then K is bought (imported) from another industry.
We assume that K and Y are exogenous to simplify the analysis.2 However, we could
assume that Y (p) = z (c  dp) and K = z (a  br), where z is a large positive integer, and
the results of this paper would still carry on. This latter weaker assumption would ensure
that there is always an interior solution where all rms of the same type produce the same
combination of outputs. The prices p and k are still endogenous.
Let kp be the amount of intermediate input that the vertically integrated rm purchases on
the market, and let ki be the amount of intermediate output that the vertically integrated
rm produces for its own use. Then ki + kp = k (y), where k (y) is the total amount of
k that the vertically integrated rm needs to produce y. We dene by ks the surplus of
intermediate input that the vertically integrated rm may produce. We dene by kU the
amount of intermediate output produced by the specialized upstream rms.
We dene by yD the amount of nal output produced by the specialized downstream
rms.
1Proposition 1 in Panzar and Willig [1981] states that economies of scope are su¢ cient for the existence
of multiproduct rms in a multiproduct competitive equilibrium, and weak economies of scope are necessary
for such existence of a multiproduct rm. Notice that their proposition does not refer to the nature (e.g.
nal or intermediate) of the goods. Here, a multi-product rm is a vertically integrated rm.
2See Eaton and Lemche [1991] for an extension of MacDonald and Slivinski [1987] that allows for endoge-
nous demands. The analysis could be developed with inverse demand schedules r = A BKs and P = C DY
instead of a xed demands KDs and Y
D. Consider the case when only vertically integrated rms are in the
market. Then they would choose 2w
 
yI + kIs

= A BnIkIs and 2w
 
yI + kIs

+ 2wyI = C  DnIyI . Once
we add the zero prot condition (F I = w
 
yI + kIs
2
+w
 
yI
2
), these are three equations in three unknowns
(yI , kIs and n
I) and the analysis is analogous to the one in the text. When we do the comparative statics
exercises, we would study changes in the parameters A, B, C and D rather than KDs . For sake of simplicity
we have decided to present the model with KDs exogenous. See Baumol, Panzar, and Willig [1982] for more
on this.
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Let nI , nD, and nU denote the number of vertically integrated, downstream, and upstream
rms, respectively. Next, we dene a competitive vertical equilibrium:3
Denition 4 A competitive vertical equilibrium with free entry is given by a pair of prices
for the nal and intermediate goods (pe; re) and two market clearing conditions Y =
nIyI + nDyD and K =
 
kIs   kIp

nI + kUnU , such that the pattern of integration of an
industry satises the following conditions: i) no active rm can benet from altering
its choice of the stages at which it operates; ii) no active rm can prot by changing
output levels; iii) no potential rm nds protable to enter into the industry; iv) all
the rms in the industry, both incumbent and potential entrants, are price takers.
4 Equilibrium without Outsourcing
For sake of simplicity of exposition, we assume that the vertically integrated rm cannot
buy intermediate input on the market. In section 5 we relax this assumption and let the
vertically integrated rm buy some of the intermediate input on the market (this is what we
call outsourcing) and study how the comparative statics results change.
In this section we also maintain that Ks > 0, that is the industry produces a surplus of
intermediate outputs. The industry sells its surplus of intermediates to another industry.
Following MacDonald and Slivinski [1987], we assume that k = g (x) =
p
x, and y =
min
p
xy; k
	
. Hence, ki + kp = y. Downstream, upstream and vertically integrated rms
face xed costs equal to FD; FU , and F I .4 Then we can write their cost functions as follows:
3Perry [1989] rst dened a vertical equilibrium to be a pattern of integration in the industry such that
no rm would alter its choice of the stages at which it operates. Perry also provides a superb review of the
early literature on vertical integration.
4The analysis in this paper, as in MacDonald and Slivinski [1987] assumes that the source of economies
of scope are di¤erences in the xed costs across rms. However, we could develop the analysis assuming
that there are cost complementarities in the production and no di¤erences in the xed costs. For example,
assume CIs (y; ks;w) = F I + w [y (1  d) + ks]2 + wy2. The term d denotes the extent to which there are
cost complementarities in the production of y and k. In particular, observe that CIsky (y; ks;w) = 2w (1  d).
If d > 1 there are cost complementarities in the production of the nal and intermediate output. The
vertically integrated rm saves money even if 0 < d < 1, though there are cost rivalries in such a case. The
equilibrium analysis would be analagous, but the results would depend on the magnitude of d rather than
on the relationship between FU , FD and F I . Interestingly, Stigler [1951] talks about complementary and
rival production processes in his article.
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CU (k;w) = FU + wk2;
CD (y;w; r) = FD + ry + wy2;
CIs (y; y + ks;w; r) = F
I + w (y + ks)
2 + wy2:
The only interesting case is when F I < FU + FD, FU < F I , and FD < F I . If
F I > FU + FD, then there are no economies of scope and only specialized rms will be
present in equilibrium. To see why, observe that there are marginal rivalries (as opposed to
complementarities) between the production of y and k in a vertically integrated rm, which
are captured by the interaction term 2wyks. It is the trade-o¤ between marginal rivalries
and economies of scope in the xed costs that leads to the simultaneous presence of vertically
integrated and specialized rms. This is the critical element of the paper and does not de-
pend on the functional forms we use and on the fact that we limit the analysis to economies
of scope only in the xed costs. One could envisage a situation where economies of scope
are in the marginal costs (i.e. cost complementarities), while rivalries are in the xed costs.
As long as there exists a trade-o¤, then more than one type of rm can exist in equilibrium.
4.0.1 The Equilibrium Conditions
If downstream and upstream rms are present in equilibrium, then the prices of the interme-
diate input k and of the nal output y are uniquely pinned down, and given by re = 2
p
FUw
and pe = 2
p
FUw + 2
p
FDw. These are the average costs faced by the specialized rms at
their minimum e¢ cient scales. kmes =
q
FU
w
and ymes =
q
FD
w
are the minimum e¢ cient
scale outputs for the upstream and downstream rms. Since the industry is perfectly com-
petitive, rms will charge prices where their average costs are the lowest. We now lay out
the conditions under which a vertically integrated rm exists.
Vertically integrated rms cannot charge higher prices than the vertically specialized rms
in a perfectly competitive industry. Thus re  2
p
FUw and pe  2
p
FUw+ 2
p
FDw. More-
over, competitive vertically integrated rms must produce locally at constant multiproduct
returns to scale otherwise they could increase their prots with a marginal increase or de-
crease of their production outputs. Hence, the following must hold
CRS : F I = w
 
yI + kIs
2
+ w
 
yI
2
;
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Competitive vertically integrated rms must also choose production outputs where the
product-specic economies of scale display either increasing or constant returns to scale
otherwise they would be facing decreasing returns to scale, and have an incentive to lower
their output production. Hence,
SPEC : yI 
r
F I   FU
2w
;
Finally, the cost for a vertically integrated rm to produce a combination of outputs must
not be larger than those that specialized rms jointly face if they produce at their minimum
e¢ cient scale otherwise the specialized rms would be able to charge lower prices than the
vertically integrated rm can a¤ord. Hence,
INT : 2
p
FUw +
p
FDw

yI + 2
p
FUwkIs  F I + w
 
yI + kIs
2
+ w
 
yI
2
;
These three conditions are very intuitive, and lead to clear comparative statics predictions
that depend on FU , FD and F I , as shown in Figure 1.
The curve CRS in Figure 1 corresponds to the combinations of outputs at which the
vertically integrated rms are producing at constant returns to scale. Any equilibrium com-
bination of outputs produced by vertically integrated rms must lie on this curve. All points
on the left hand side of SPEC are points where the vertically integrated rm is producing
at product specic decreasing returns to scale. Finally only the points inside the the ellipsis
INT are those where the vertically integrated rm is producing at lower costs than special-
ized rms. If vertically integrated rms are present in equilibrium, then they must produce
combinations of outputs that are in the bold portion of CRS.
Figure 1 presents the possible equilibrium outputs produced by the vertically integrated
rms for di¤erent values of the ratio F
U
FD
. Figure 1a presents the set of equilibrium combi-
nation that the vertically integrated rms can choose when the xed costs of the upstream
rm are very high relative to those of the downstream rm; Figure 1b, 1c and 1d present
the same set of points for decreasing values of the ratio F
U
FD
. As the ratio F
U
FD
decreases, the
set of combinations at which the vertically integrated rm can be in equilibrium shifts to
southeast. The last two cases where the curve INT intersects the y   axis (Figures 1c and
1d) occur when FU + FD + 2
p
FUFD > 2F I .5
5To see why, observe that when INT and the y  axis intersect ks = 0 and so 2
p
FUw +
p
FDw
2
yI =
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4.0.2 Determination of the Equilibrium Structure
In the previous section we have determined the set of combination of outputs that vertically
integrated rms must produce to exist in equilibrium. The aggregate demands of the inter-
mediate and nal goods determine which of the possible combinations vertically integrated
rms produce in equilibrium.
The ratio of exogenous aggregate demands, K
D
s
Y D
, can be plotted on the same gures 1a
and 1b. Depending on where it lies, either on the marked segment or outside of it, a di¤erent
market structure will occur. To see this, denote by K
A
s
Y A
the line which goes through the point
A and by K
B
s
Y B
the line which goes through the point B in gures 2a and 2b.
Consider rst the case when the output ratio K
D
s
Y D
crosses the marked segment, that is
to say K
A
s
Y A
 KDs
Y D
 KBs
Y B
in gure 2a or 0  KDs
Y D
 KBs
Y B
in gure 2b. If each vertically
integrated rm chooses to produce a combination of outputs
 
kIs ; y
I

such that k
I
s
yI
= K
D
s
Y D
,
and such that nIkIs = K
D
s and n
IyI = Y D, where n is the number of vertically integrated
rms in the market, then there would not be demand left for any specialized rm. Hence
only vertically integrated rms would be present in equilibrium. It turns out that this is the
only equilibrium market structure when K
A
s
Y A
 KDs
Y D
 KBs
Y B
:
Proposition 1 When max
n
0; K
A
s
Y A
o
 KDs
Y D
 KBs
Y B
then only vertically integrated rms are
present in equilibrium. Each one of them produces the output combination (y; ks) which
is located where the ratio K
D
s
Y D
crosses the curve CRS. The prices pe and re are functions
of the ratio K
D
s
Y D
.
For example, let K
D
s
Y D
= 3
2
and let the vertically integrated rms choose the output com-
bination
 
yI ; kIs

such that kIs =
3
2
yI . At that output ratio, pe = 2wkIs + 4wy
I = 7wyI and
re = 5wyI . In equilibrium rms must make zero prot, hence yI =
q
4
29
F I
w
, pe = 7
q
4w
29
F I ,
kIs = 3
q
1
29
F I
w
and re = 5
q
4w
29
F I .
Vertically integrated rms all choose the same combination of outputs for a given set of
input and output prices and they are able to fully serve the aggregate demands KDs and
Y D. In such context, the upstream and downstream rms cannot be present in the market
because they are unable to supply outputs at lower prices (since condition INT holds).
F I + 2w
 
yI
2
. This equation has a solution when FU + FD + 2
p
FUFD > 2F I .
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Figure 1a: The Market When Upstream Fixed Costs are Very High
Ks
SPEC
INT
CRS
Y
Figure 1b: The Market When Upstream Fixed Costs are High
Ks
SPEC
INT
CRS
Y
Figure 1c: The Market When Downstream Fixed Costs are High
Ks
SPEC
INT
CRS
Y
Figure 1d: The Market When Downstream Fixed Costs are Very High
Ks
SPEC
INT
CRS
Y
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Consider now the case when K
D
s
Y D
crosses the CRS curve outside of the bold segment of the
curve CRS. We need to address two questions: Will vertically integrated rms be present
in equilibrium? Will they be able to serve both the aggregate demand of the nal and
intermediate outputs? The answer to the rst question is always positive (as from Panzar
and Willig [1981]) and the answer to the second question is always negative.
Figure 2 presents two sets of possible equilibrium output combinations for the vertically
integrated rms, which are drawn for di¤erent values of the parameters FU , F I , and FD.
We will only comment on the equilibrium congurations in Figure 2a, since Figure 2b is a
special case of Figure 2a.
Suppose that K
D
s
Y D
> K
B
s
Y B
, which is the situation when there is a relatively large demand
(external to the industry) for k. Upstream rms must be present to satisfy part of this
demand, since an industry with only vertically integrated rms would be unable to serve
the demand. To see this, observe that each vertically integrated rm must choose the same
output ratio k
I
s
yI
but k
I
s
yI
 KBs
Y B
< K
D
s
Y D
so there is no number of integrated rms that can serve
both KDs and Y
D. There is an excess demand of intermediate output that the vertically
integrated rms cannot serve in equilibrium. In order for the equilibrium to be perfectly
competitive, rms must produce where their average cost are lowest. Hence, the prices of
the intermediate input in equilibrium must be re = 2
p
FUw. Using the condition that the
marginal costs must be equal to prices, 2w (y + ks) = 2
p
FUw and 2w (y + ks) + 2wy = pe.
Using the zero prot condition, we nd that the price of the nal output in this equilibrium
is pe = 2
p
FUw + 2
p
w (F I   FU), which is lower than 2
p
FUw + 2
p
wFD, the price that a
downstream rm would set.
The proofs in this paper use this recursive approach: when specialized rms exist in
equilibrium, then they must set prices equal to the lowest average cost. Then, we use the
prot maximization condition and the free entry condition to determine the price of the
other good that the vertically integrated rms must charge in equilibrium.
The following proposition characterizes the full set of equilibria for this market for di¤erent
values of the parameters FU , F I , and FD:
Proposition 2 There are two general cases.
Case 1) Let 2FU > F I . Then:
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1a) If K
D
s
Y D
> K
B
s
Y B
, then vertically integrated rms and upstream rms are present
in equilibrium. Vertically integrated rms produce a surplus of k, ks > 0, to be sold in
the market. In particular, re = 2
p
FUw and pe = 2
p
FUw + 2
p
w (F I   FU).
1b) If K
D
s
Y D
< K
A
s
Y A
, then vertically integrated rms and downstream rms are present
in equilibrium. Vertically integrated rms produce a surplus of k, ks > 0, to be sold in
the market. In particular, re = 2
p
w (F I   FD) and pe = 2pw (F I   FD)+ 2pFDw.
Case 2) Let 2FD > F I and FU + FD + 2
p
FUFD > 2F I . Let
KDs
Y D
>
KBs
Y B
. Then
upstream and vertically integrated rms are present in equilibrium. The prices are
re = 2
p
FUw and pe = 2
p
wF I .
5 Equilibrium with Outsourcing
In the previous section we have studied the case when vertically integrated rms might
produce a surplus of intermediate good. Now we consider the opposite case when they
purchase (part of) the intermediate input they need to produce the nal output, which
occurs when the upstream xed costs are small relative to the downstream xed costs. We
still maintain that Ks > 0, that is the industry produces a surplus of intermediate outputs
that it sells to another industry.
If the size of and KDs =Y
D > KBs =Y
B, then the vertically integrated rm prefers to
outsource part of the production to the upstream rm and exploit its economies of vertical
scope to produce y at a lower costs than the downstream rm can produce it.
Only the cost function of the vertically integrated rm changes and is as follows:
CIp (y; ki;w; r) = F
I + wk2i + wy
2 + r (y   ki) ;
where ki represents the amount of intermediate input produced in-house. y   ki is the
amount of production of input ki that is outsourced to specialized rms.
We rewrite the cost function in terms of kp = y   ki:
CIp (y; y   kp;w; r) = F I + w (y   kp)2 + wy2 + rkp:
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Figure 2a: Equilibrium Outputs of the Vertically Integrated Firm
Case I: FU+FD+2(FUFD)1/2<2FI and 2FU>FI
Ks Ks
B/Ys
B
vi & u
vi only
B
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A/Ys
A
A
vi & d
Y
Figure 2b: Equilibrium Outputs of the Vertically Integrated Firm
Case II: FU+FD+2(FUFD)1/2>2FI and 2FD>FI
Ks
vi & u
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B/Ys
B
B
vi only
Y
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Thus the combinations
 
kIp; y
I

which are compatible with a vertical competitive equilib-
rium must be such that:
CRS : F I = w (y   kp)2 + wy2;
INT : 2
p
FUw +
p
FDw

y  F I + w (y   kp)2 + wy2 + 2
p
FUwkp:
As before, if vertically integrated rms are present in equilibrium, then they must produce
combinations of outputs that are in the bold portion of CRS. Also, only the points inside
the the ellipsis INT are those where the vertically integrated rm is producing at lower costs
than specialized rms. Notice that the condition that vertically integrated rms produce at
product specic decreasing returns to scale (SPEC) is always satised when the vertically
integrated rm does not produce a surplus of intermediate good.
When vertically integrated rms outsource part of the production of the intermediate
input to specialized rms, their internal cost of producing k must equal to the market price
for k. Hence, the marginal cost of an additional unit of intermediate good must be equal to
the market price for it:
OUT : y = kp +
p
FU=w:
For a vertically integrated rm to be in equilibrium, it must produce a combination of
outputs that is inside the ellipsis INT , it lies along the curve CRS and is on the line
OUT . Figure 3 shows there is only one point that satises all three conditions, where OUT
intersects CRS.
This observation leads to the second set of possible market structures:
Proposition 3 Let 2FD > F I and FU + FD + 2
p
FUFD < 2F I Then (outsourcing)
vertically integrated rms and upstream rms are present in equilibrium. The combi-
nation of outputs chosen by the vertically integrated rm is given by yI =
q
F I FU
w
and kIp =
q
F I FU
w
 
q
FU
w
. The equilibrium prices are given by re = 2
p
FUw and
pe = 2
p
w (F I   FU) + 2
p
wFU .
6 Equilibrium and Comparative Statics
In this section, we illustrate the full set of equilibrium market structures for an industry that
sells (e.g. exports) the intermediate good to another industry. To do this, we rst give
the exact denition of the cost function of the vertically integrated rm:
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Figure 3: Outsourcing
2FD>FI andFU+FD+2(FUFD)1/2<2FI
Ks
(vi only - no
outsourcing here)
Y
kpe (Fu/w)1/2 OUT
Output combination chosen
Kp by the vertically integrated
firms when they outsource
part of the production of k
CI =

CIs (y; y + ks;w; r) = F
I + w (y + ks)
2 + wy2; if ks  0:
CIp (y; y   kp;w; r) = F I + w (y   kp)2 + wy2 + rkp, if kp  0:
Notice that CIs (y; y + ks;w; r) = CIp (y; y   kp;w; r) when ks = 0 and kp = 0 - the cost
function is continuous when the vertically integrated rm consumes all the intermediate
output that it produces in-house.
6.0.3 Equilibria
Depending on the values taken by FU , FD, and F I there are three possible equilibrium
congurations for the industry, and they are presented in Figure 4 (where, as usual, kp =  ki
for simplicity of exposition). Consider rst the cases illustrated by Figure 4a and Figure 4b.
Here, there are three possible industry structures: when there is a relatively large demand for
the intermediate good, KDs =Y
D > KBs =Y
B, then we have upstream and vertically integrated
rms in equilibrium. Vertically integrated rms produce a surplus of intermediate output
if the upstream costs are very high while they outsource part of the production of the
intermediate to specialized rms if the downstream costs are high. The intuition here is that
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the vertically integrated rms are more exible than specialized rms and can dedicate their
production to the good with the highest costs.
6.0.4 Comparative Statics
A Change in the Demand Consider the e¤ect of a change in the aggregate demands.
Suppose that we start with 2FD > F I > 2FU and an output ratio KAs =Y
A  KDs =Y D 
KBs =Y
B. We are then in the economy depicted by Figure 4a, where only vertically integrated
rms serve the demands Y D andKDs . AsK
D
s increases, for example because another industry
is growing and demands k, then the output ratio KDs =Y
D increases as well, and at some
point it becomes greater than K
B
s
Y B
. As soon as that happens, upstream rms start entering
into the market to serve part of the (external) demand of intermediate output. When KDs
decreases and becomes smaller than KAs =Y
A we will observe entry of downstream rms into
the industry. Notice that vertically integrated rms will always be present in the industry
as long as economies of vertical scope exist.
A Change in the Costs Now consider changes in the xed costs. Suppose that both FD
and F I increase, while FU remains unchanged, so that we still have F I < FU+FD. Suppose,
moreover, that KDs =Y
D is smaller than KAs =Y
A so that we are in Figure 4a, with vertically
integrated and downstream rms serving the markets. As FD increases relative to FU , the
set of combinations that the vertically integrated rms can choose in equilibrium moves
to southeast, and when FD becomes larger than FU (with F I < FU + FD still holding),
the industry attains the conguration given in Figure 4b, with outsourcing and vertically
integrated and upstream rms serving the markets.
7 Equilibrium and Comparative Statics in an Import-
ing Industry
To close the model, we consider an industry (e.g. its vertically integrated rms) that is a
net buyer of the intermediate output, that is Kp =  Ks > 0. For this to occur, it has to
be true that another industry that produces k can produce it at a lower cost. Call the price
of the intermediate good k produced by the other industry as rf . Thus, rf < 2
p
FUw, and
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Figure 4a: Equilibrium Market Strucures (I)
2FU>FI>2FD
Ks Ks
B/Ys
B
vi & u
vi only
B
Ks
A/Ys
A
A
vi & d KsD/YsD
Y
Figure 4b: Equilibrium Market Strucures (II)
2FD>FI andFU+FD+2(FUFD)1/2<2FI
Ks
u & vi (outsourcing)
Ks
D/Ys
D
Y
(Fu/w)1/2 OUT
Output combination chosen
Kp by the vertically integrated
firms when they outsource
part of the production of k
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upstream rms cannot be present in equilibrium because their lowest average cost is higher
than the market price for the intermediate input.
The relevant issue is which type of rms, between vertically integrated and specialized
downstream, exist in equilibrium. Not surprisingly, it depends on the relative magnitude
of the xed costs faced by the downstream and by the vertically integrated rms. When
the price of the intermediate good produced by another industry is very low, then vertically
integrated rms cannot be in the market, regardless of how strong the economies of vertical
scope are. Hence, we will observe downstream specialization when the imported interme-
diates are very cheap relatively to the prices that the domestic upstream producers would
charge.
When the price at which another industry is selling the intermediate good is not too low,
then whether we observe vertically integrated rms or downstream specialized rms depends
on the magnitude of the economies of vertical scope. If the economies of vertical scope
are very strong, then the vertically integrated rms will outsource some of their demand of
intermediate good to rms in another industry. However, when the economies of vertical
scope are not strong enough, then again only downstream rms will be serving the market
for the nal good.
The following proposition formalizes these results:
Proposition 4 There are three possible industry congurations:
If rf > 2
p
wFD and FD + (
rf)
2
4w
  F I < 0, or if rf < 2
p
wFD, then only downstream
rms are present in equilibrium, and pe = rf + 2
p
FDw.
If rf > 2
p
wFD and FD + (
rf)
2
4w
  F I > 0 then only vertically integrated rms are
present in equilibrium. The prices are functions of the output ratio
KDp
Y D
.
8 Summary and Conclusions
We summarize the results of this paper in Figure 5:
 When the xed costs for the upstream producers are small relative to those of the
downstream producers, vertically integrated rms exploit their economies of vertical
scope in the production of the nal good, and possibly outsource part of the production
of the intermediate input to specialized upstream rms.
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 When the xed costs for the upstream producers are large relative to those of the
downstream producers, then the industry structure is determined by the ratio of the
demand for the nal good and the demand for the intermediate inputs by another
industry.
 Finally, when the industry is a net buyer (e.g. an importer) of the intermediate
input, then vertically integrated rms can only exist in equilibrium if the economies of
vertical scope are very strong.
Figure 5: A Summary of the Results
rf<2(wFD)1/2 Only Specialized Downstream Firms
rf<2(wFU)1/2 Import FD+(rf)2/4w-FI<0 Only Specialized Downstream Firms
rf<2(wFD)1/2
FD+(rf)2/4w-FI>0 Only Outsourcing Vertically Integrated Firms
Ks
A/Ys
A<Ks/Ys<Ks
B/Ys
B Only Vertically Integrated Firms
Ks/Ys<Ks
A/Ys
A Vertically Integrated Firms
FU>FD and Specialized Downstream Firms
rf>2(wFU)1/2 Exports Ks/Ys>Ks
B/Ys
B Vertically Integrated Firms
and Specialized Upstream Firms
FU+FD+2(FUFD)1/2>2FI Upstream Specialized and
FU<FD Vertically Integrated Firms
FU+FD+2(FUFD)1/2<2FI Upstream Specialized and Outsourcing
Vertically Integrated Firms
While the results are for specic functional forms, the economic trade-o¤underlying them
is very general and thus the results are likely to hold if we extend the model to allow for cost
complementarities or for more general specications of demand functions. The critical idea
is that there must exist some trade-o¤ in the production of the intermediate and nal goods.
In the model that we have considered, vertically integrated rms can exploit economies of
vertical scope in the xed costs, but face rivalries (rather than complementarities) in the
marginal costs. Hence, both types of rms can exist.
Economies of vertical scope in the xed costs are likely to exist when rms are still
learning how to produce nal goods and how to design the best intermediate inputs for the
nal goods. Firms can then benet from producing both at the same time. As time goes on,
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the process of learning by doing will standardize the production processes, and economies of
scope will slowly disappear.
We would like to conclude with a discussion of the limitations of our analysis and with a
suggestion for future research topics. First, our paper o¤ers no explanation of the production
activities in the industry that buys the surplus of intermediate input. That is, where does
the external demand and supply come from for the intermediate good k? Future work might
draw interesting conclusions by interacting our ideas of scope economies with those in the
trade literature. Second, our paper takes the existence of economies of scope as a black box.
Future work might look at what originates economies of scope. For example, one might look
at the role of learning-by-doing and investigate how growth a¤ects industry structure or,
vice-versa, how endogenizing vertical structure a¤ects growth.
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10 Appendix
10.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Let the equilibrium price of k be re and the equilibrium price of y be pe. Each
vertically integrated rm must choose kI and yI such that CIsy = p
e and CIsk = r
e. Because of
the assumptions on the cost functions (they are U shaped) this is a system of two equations
in two unknowns with an unique solution (if it exists). Hence, all vertically integrated
rms choose the same combination
 
yI ; kIs

such that k
I
s
yI
= K
D
s
Y D
. Thus, 2wyI

1 + K
D
s
Y D

=
re and 2wyI

2 + K
D
s
Y D

= pe. In equilibrium rms must make zero prot, hence F I =
w
 
yI
2
1 +

1 + K
D
s
Y D
2
and so yI =
s
F I=

1 +

1 + K
D
s
Y D
2
. From yI we can determine
kI and the equilibrium prices.
10.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The rst case when 2FU > F I is already proved in the text. Consider the
second case when K
D
s
Y D
< K
A
s
Y A
. Downstream rms must be present in equilibrium because
the vertically integrated rms cannot serve all of the demand of y on their own. The price
of the nal good must then be equal to pe = re + 2
p
FDw. Hence, 2w
 
yI + kIs

= re.
This implies that yI =
q
FD
w
and re = 2w
q
FD
w
+ kIs

. Using the zero prot condition,
we nd kIs =
q
F I FD
w
 
q
FD
w
, re = 2
p
w (F I   FD), pe = 2pw (F I   FD) + 2pFDw.
re = 2
p
w (F I   FD) is less than 2
p
FUw, the average cost at the minimum e¢ cient scale
of production of the upstream rms.
Now consider the cases when 2FD > F I and FU + FD + 2
p
FUFD > 2F I . K
D
s
Y D
>
KBs
Y B
-
there is again a relatively large demand for k and upstream rms must be present to satisfy
at least part of this demand. Vertically integrated rms are still present. To see this, rst
observe that re = 2
p
FUw since upstream rms must be in equilibrium. The only way in
which the optimization problem of the vertically integrated rm could have an interior solu-
tion is if kIs =
q
FU
w
 
q
F I FU
w
which is negative. We assumed that the vertically integrated
rm cannot purchase intermediate input, hence the best that the vertically integrated rm
can do is to set kIs = 0. Then, using C
Is
y = p
e and kIs = 0, we nd 4wy = p
e. Using the
CRS condition we have F I = 2wy2, y =
q
F I
2w
. Thus, pe = 2
p
wF I , which is smaller than
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the price that the downstream rm would set, 2
p
FUw + 2
p
FDw.
10.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. To show that a market structure with vertically integrated and upstream rms
would be an equilibrium conguration, observe that the price of the intermediate input has
to be equal to r = 2
p
FUw. The vertically integrated rm chooses kIi and y
I to maximize
its prots. Thus, yI =
q
F I FU
w
and ki =
q
FU
w
, or kIp =
q
F I FU
w
 
q
FU
w
. The price of the
nal output is then pe = 2
p
w (F I   FU) + 2
p
wFU , lower than the price the downstream
rms would be able to set. The prots of both types of rms are zero.
10.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Suppose that downstream rms are in present in equilibrium and vertically inte-
grated rms are not outsourcing any of the production of k. Then 2w
 
yI + kIs

= rf and
2w
 
yI + kIs

+2wyI = rf +2
p
FDw. Then yI =
q
FD
w
and kIs =
rf
2w
  yI or kIs = r
f
2w
 
q
FD
w
.
This can be an equilibrium if rf > 2
p
wFD. However, it is not an equilibrium because the
vertically integrated rm makes positive prots. To see this, observe that the prot can
be written as

2
p
wFD + rf
q
FD
w
+ rf

rf
2w
 
q
FD
w

  F I   w

rf
2w
2
  FD, which turns
out to be equal to FD + (
rf)
2
4w
  F I . Only downstream rms are present in equilibrium if
FD +
(rf)
2
4w
  F I < 0, while only vertically integrated rms are present in equilibrium if
FD +
(rf)
2
4w
  F I > 0.
Now consider rf < 2
p
wFD. If vertically integrated rms and downstream rms are in
equilibrium, then 2wkIi   rf = rf and 2wyI + rf = rf + 2
p
FDw, with yI =
q
FD
w
and
kIp =
q
FD
w
  rf
2w
. The prot of the vertically integrated rm is now given by FD F I   (r
f)
2
2w
which is again less than zero, and so only downstream rms are present in equilibrium.
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